Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements

The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior

J.J.M. Potters, R. Sloof, F.A.A.M. van Winden

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

253 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate’s intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate’s campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an intermediary to filter their opposing interests.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages33
Volume1997-27
Publication statusPublished - 1997

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1997-27

Fingerprint

voter
expenditures
money
campaign
candidacy
interest group

Keywords

  • campaign expenditures
  • endorsements
  • interest groups

Cite this

Potters, J. J. M., Sloof, R., & van Winden, F. A. A. M. (1997). Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements: The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1997-27). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
@techreport{bc8830059bbe4b3d9ade25282d5076c2,
title = "Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements: The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior",
abstract = "A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate’s intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate’s campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an intermediary to filter their opposing interests.",
keywords = "campaign expenditures, endorsements, interest groups",
author = "J.J.M. Potters and R. Sloof and {van Winden}, F.A.A.M.",
note = "Pagination: 33",
year = "1997",
language = "English",
volume = "1997-27",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",

}

Potters, JJM, Sloof, R & van Winden, FAAM 1997 'Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements: The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1997-27, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements : The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior. / Potters, J.J.M.; Sloof, R.; van Winden, F.A.A.M.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 1997. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1997-27).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements

T2 - The Strategic Use of Information and Money to Influence Voter Behavior

AU - Potters, J.J.M.

AU - Sloof, R.

AU - van Winden, F.A.A.M.

N1 - Pagination: 33

PY - 1997

Y1 - 1997

N2 - A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate’s intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate’s campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an intermediary to filter their opposing interests.

AB - A costly signaling model is presented in which we show how campaign expenditures can buy votes. The model shows that the amount of campaign expenditures may convey the electorate information about the candidate’s intended policy. When this model is extended to allow for a contributing interest group, it appears that for campaigning to be informative it is sometimes crucial that campaign funds are supplied by informed third parties. The extension also provides an explanation why interest groups contribute to the candidate’s campaign, rather than using direct endorsements; they may need the candidate as an intermediary to filter their opposing interests.

KW - campaign expenditures

KW - endorsements

KW - interest groups

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 1997-27

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Campaign Expenditures, Contributions and Direct Endorsements

PB - Microeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -