Carbon is forever

A climate change experiment on cooperation

Giacomo Calzolari, Marco Casari, Riccardo Ghidoni

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

Greenhouse gases generate impacts that can last longer than human civilization itself. Such persistence may affect the behavioral ability to cooperate. In a laboratory experiment, we study mitigation efforts with dynamic externalities in a framework that reflects key features of climate change. In treatments with persistence, pollution cumulates and generates damages over time, while in another treatment it has only immediate effects and then disappears. We show that with pollution persistence, cooperation is initially high but then systematically deteriorates with high stocks of pollution.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)169-184
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume92
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2018

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persistence
pollution
climate change
carbon
experiment
civilization
cumulate
greenhouse gas
mitigation
damage
co-operation
Pollution
Carbon
Persistence
Experiment
Climate change
laboratory experiment
effect
externality
Dynamic externalities

Keywords

  • Dynamic games
  • Inequality
  • Public goods
  • Stock externalities

Cite this

Calzolari, Giacomo ; Casari, Marco ; Ghidoni, Riccardo. / Carbon is forever : A climate change experiment on cooperation. In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 2018 ; Vol. 92. pp. 169-184.
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Carbon is forever : A climate change experiment on cooperation. / Calzolari, Giacomo; Casari, Marco; Ghidoni, Riccardo.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 92, 01.11.2018, p. 169-184.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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