Central bank independence before and after the crisis

J. de Haan, Christina Bodea, Raymond Hicks, Sylvester Eijffinger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper discusses whether central bank independence (CBI) has changed since the financial crisis. Central banks’ quasi-fiscal policies during and after the crisis, and macro-prudential and unconventional monetary policies, which are more redistributive than traditional monetary policy, have led to questions about the desirability of CBI. Some even argue that CBI is under threat. However, a survey among central bankers and updates of legal proxies for CBI do not provide strong evidence that CBI has diminished since the financial crisis. The only indication for this is the increase in the turnover rate of central bank governors in advanced countries.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)183-202
JournalComparative Economic Studies
Volume60
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2018

Fingerprint

Central bank independence
Financial crisis
Central bank
Turnover
Unconventional monetary policy
Threat
Bankers
Monetary policy
Fiscal policy

Keywords

  • central bank independence
  • central bank accountability
  • unconventional monetary policy

Cite this

de Haan, J. ; Bodea, Christina ; Hicks, Raymond ; Eijffinger, Sylvester. / Central bank independence before and after the crisis. In: Comparative Economic Studies. 2018 ; Vol. 60, No. 2. pp. 183-202.
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Central bank independence before and after the crisis. / de Haan, J.; Bodea, Christina; Hicks, Raymond; Eijffinger, Sylvester.

In: Comparative Economic Studies, Vol. 60, No. 2, 06.2018, p. 183-202.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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