Central bank independence before and after the crisis

J. de Haan, Christina Bodea, Raymond Hicks, Sylvester Eijffinger

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

35 Citations (Scopus)


This paper discusses whether central bank independence (CBI) has changed since the financial crisis. Central banks’ quasi-fiscal policies during and after the crisis, and macro-prudential and unconventional monetary policies, which are more redistributive than traditional monetary policy, have led to questions about the desirability of CBI. Some even argue that CBI is under threat. However, a survey among central bankers and updates of legal proxies for CBI do not provide strong evidence that CBI has diminished since the financial crisis. The only indication for this is the increase in the turnover rate of central bank governors in advanced countries.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)183-202
JournalComparative Economic Studies
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Jun 2018


  • central bank independence
  • central bank accountability
  • unconventional monetary policy


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