Centrality and cooperation in networks

Boris van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)178-196
JournalExperimental Economics
Volume22
Issue number1
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019

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Centrality
Tolerance
Participation
Exclusion
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Keywords

  • Cooperation
  • Centrality
  • Public Goods
  • Networks

Cite this

van Leeuwen, Boris ; Ramalingam, Abhijit ; Rojo Arjona, David ; Schram, Arthur. / Centrality and cooperation in networks. In: Experimental Economics. 2019 ; Vol. 22, No. 1. pp. 178-196.
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van Leeuwen, B, Ramalingam, A, Rojo Arjona, D & Schram, A 2019, 'Centrality and cooperation in networks' Experimental Economics, vol. 22, no. 1, pp. 178-196. https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1

Centrality and cooperation in networks. / van Leeuwen, Boris; Ramalingam, Abhijit; Rojo Arjona, David; Schram, Arthur.

In: Experimental Economics, Vol. 22, No. 1, 03.2019, p. 178-196.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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