Centrality and cooperation in networks

Boris van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

8 Citations (Scopus)
167 Downloads (Pure)


We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)178-196
JournalExperimental Economics
Issue number1
Publication statusPublished - Mar 2019


  • Cooperation
  • Centrality
  • Public Goods
  • Networks


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