Centrality and cooperation in networks

Boris van Leeuwen; Abhijit Ramalingam; David Rojo Arjona; Arthur Schram

doi:10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1

Centrality and cooperation in networks

Boris van Leeuwen, Abhijit Ramalingam, David Rojo Arjona, Arthur Schram

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Abstract

We investigate the effects of centrality on cooperation in groups. Players with centrality keep a group together by having a pivotal position in a network. In some of our experimental treatments, players can vote to exclude others and prevent them from further participation in the group. We find that, in the presence of exclusion, central players contribute significantly less than others, and that this is tolerated by those others. Because of this tolerance, groups with centrality manage to maintain high levels of cooperation.

Original language	English
Pages (from-to)	178-196
Journal	Experimental Economics
Volume	22
Issue number	1
DOIs	https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-018-9592-1
Publication status	Published - Mar 2019

Keywords

Cooperation
Centrality
Public Goods
Networks

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KW - Public Goods

KW - Networks

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Centrality and cooperation in networks

Abstract

Keywords

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