Centralized common-pool management and local community participation

J. Vyrastekova, D.P. van Soest

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

32 Citations (Scopus)


We use common-pool resource experiments to explore whether allowing resource users to vote on a natural resource management institution’s incentive structure enhances the efficiency of resource use. We hypothesize that voting enables users to communicate their willingness to limit excess resource exploitation. Compared to games in which appropriate incentives are imposed exogenously, behavior is more cooperative conditional on a majority having voted for that structure. However, the effectiveness of this form of local community participation in resource management is limited as in more than half of the cases, only a minority votes in favor of implementing that incentive structure.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)500-514
Number of pages14
JournalLand Economics
Issue number4
Publication statusPublished - 2003


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