Charles S. Peirce and the Feeling of Understanding: The Power and Limit of Science from a Pragmatist Perspective

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    Abstract

    In two early and classic papers, “The Fixation of Belief” and “How to Make Our Ideas Clear,” Peirce draws attention to the evolutionary biology of humans and how it might have repercussions for the way our beliefs and feelings relate to the results of inquiry, even if that inquiry is scientific. We find relevant pragmatist ideas suggesting that the feeling of understanding generated by scientific explanations is not a reliable indicator for thinking our beliefs are true. This offers a new way to criticize the currently widely supported contextual theory of scientific understanding. Surprisingly, the feeling of understanding might be an evolutionary bias leading to pseudoscientific beliefs. Peirce's two classic papers continue to be valuable resources to help us grasp the way humans manage their beliefs and feelings.
    Original languageEnglish
    Title of host publicationThe Oxford handbook of Charles S. Peirce
    EditorsCornelis De Waal
    Place of PublicationNew York , NY
    PublisherOxford University Press
    Chapter29
    Pages514-530
    Number of pages17
    ISBN (Electronic)9780197548585
    ISBN (Print)9780197548561
    DOIs
    Publication statusPublished - 2024

    Publication series

    NameOxford Handbooks
    PublisherOxford University Press

    Keywords

    • Charles S. Peirce
    • feeling of understanding
    • metaphor
    • scientific explanation
    • natural evolution

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