In this contribution I explain what the libertarian conception of free will is, and why it is of moral and religious importance. Consequently, I defend this conception of free will against secular and religious charges. After that, I present and evaluate neuroscientific experi-ments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s experiments. I argue that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate between compati-bilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will; that is a conceptual issue and not an empirical one. Nor do Libet’s experiments count against the libertarian conception of free will that I defend, because they deal with arbitrary actions rather than actions that we do for a reason. I conclude by summing up the case for a libertarian concep-tion of free will, giving attention especially to a religious reason for preferring this conception.
Original language | English |
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Title of host publication | Embodied Religion |
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Editors | P.H.A.I. Jonkers, M. Sarot |
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Place of Publication | Utrecht |
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Publisher | Igitur |
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Pages | 105-120 |
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Publication status | Published - 2013 |
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Name | Ars Disputandi Supplement Series |
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Number | 6 |
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