Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience

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Abstract

In this contribution I explain what the libertarian conception of free will is, and why it is of moral and religious importance. Consequently, I defend this conception of free will against secular and religious charges. After that, I present and evaluate neuroscientific experi-ments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s experiments. I argue that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate between compati-bilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will; that is a conceptual issue and not an empirical one. Nor do Libet’s experiments count against the libertarian conception of free will that I defend, because they deal with arbitrary actions rather than actions that we do for a reason. I conclude by summing up the case for a libertarian concep-tion of free will, giving attention especially to a religious reason for preferring this conception.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationEmbodied Religion
EditorsP.H.A.I. Jonkers, M. Sarot
Place of PublicationUtrecht
PublisherIgitur
Pages105-120
Publication statusPublished - 2013

Publication series

NameArs Disputandi Supplement Series
Number6

Fingerprint

Neuroscience
Christian Faith
Free Will
Conception
Experiment
Religion
Incompatibilist

Cite this

Sarot, M. (2013). Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience. In P. H. A. I. Jonkers, & M. Sarot (Eds.), Embodied Religion (pp. 105-120). (Ars Disputandi Supplement Series; No. 6). Utrecht: Igitur.
Sarot, M. / Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience. Embodied Religion. editor / P.H.A.I. Jonkers ; M. Sarot. Utrecht : Igitur, 2013. pp. 105-120 (Ars Disputandi Supplement Series; 6).
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Sarot, M 2013, Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience. in PHAI Jonkers & M Sarot (eds), Embodied Religion. Ars Disputandi Supplement Series, no. 6, Igitur, Utrecht, pp. 105-120.

Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience. / Sarot, M.

Embodied Religion. ed. / P.H.A.I. Jonkers; M. Sarot. Utrecht : Igitur, 2013. p. 105-120 (Ars Disputandi Supplement Series; No. 6).

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingChapterScientificpeer-review

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Sarot M. Christian Faith, Free Will and Neuroscience. In Jonkers PHAI, Sarot M, editors, Embodied Religion. Utrecht: Igitur. 2013. p. 105-120. (Ars Disputandi Supplement Series; 6).