In this contribution I explain what the libertarian conception of free will is, and why it is of moral and religious importance. Consequently, I defend this conception of free will against secular and religious charges. After that, I present and evaluate neuroscientific experi-ments on free will, especially Benjamin Libet’s experiments. I argue that Libet’s experiments do not decide the debate between compati-bilist and incompatibilist conceptions of free will; that is a conceptual issue and not an empirical one. Nor do Libet’s experiments count against the libertarian conception of free will that I defend, because they deal with arbitrary actions rather than actions that we do for a reason. I conclude by summing up the case for a libertarian concep-tion of free will, giving attention especially to a religious reason for preferring this conception.
|Title of host publication||Embodied Religion|
|Editors||P.H.A.I. Jonkers, M. Sarot|
|Place of Publication||Utrecht|
|Publication status||Published - 2013|
|Name||Ars Disputandi Supplement Series|