Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

H. Benchekroun, A. Ray Chaudhuri

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Abstract: This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. We further show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We examine a reduction in the emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Number of pages35
Volume2012-021
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameTilEC Discussion Paper
Volume2012-021

Fingerprint

International environmental agreements
Defects
Decay
Natural rate
Pollution
Stock pollutant

Keywords

  • transboundary pollution
  • renewable resource
  • clean technologies
  • coalition formation
  • differential games

Cite this

Benchekroun, H., & Ray Chaudhuri, A. (2012). Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. (TilEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-021). Tilburg: Economics.
Benchekroun, H. ; Ray Chaudhuri, A. / Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. Tilburg : Economics, 2012. (TilEC Discussion Paper).
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Benchekroun, H & Ray Chaudhuri, A 2012 'Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements' TilEC Discussion Paper, vol. 2012-021, Economics, Tilburg.

Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. / Benchekroun, H.; Ray Chaudhuri, A.

Tilburg : Economics, 2012. (TilEC Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-021).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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N2 - Abstract: This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. We further show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We examine a reduction in the emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants.

AB - Abstract: This paper shows that, if countries are farsighted when deciding whether to defect from a coalition, then the implementation of cleaner technologies may jeopardize the chances of reaching an international environmental agreement. The grand coalition may be destabilized by the implementation of cleaner technologies, ultimately resulting in higher global emissions and lower global welfare. We further show that the higher the stock of pollution at the instant when the cleaner technology is implemented, the more likely that the above mechanism unfolds. We examine a reduction in the emission per output ratio as well as measures that enhance the natural rate of decay of stock pollutants.

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KW - renewable resource

KW - clean technologies

KW - coalition formation

KW - differential games

M3 - Discussion paper

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T3 - TilEC Discussion Paper

BT - Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements

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Benchekroun H, Ray Chaudhuri A. Cleaner Technologies and the Stability of International Environmental Agreements. Tilburg: Economics. 2012. (TilEC Discussion Paper).