Climate policy commitment devices

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)331-343
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume92
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 1 Nov 2018

Fingerprint

environmental policy
baseline conditions
climate change
resource
fossil fuel
viability
carbon
climate
Resource extraction
Climate policy
policy
Viability
Social preferences
Climate change policy
Climate
Policy intervention
Uncertainty
Carbon
Energy sources
Dictatorship

Keywords

  • climate policy instruments
  • intertemporal cooperation
  • climate change
  • experiments

Cite this

@article{592e781b060348c7a6e1649455267fc3,
title = "Climate policy commitment devices",
abstract = "We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.",
keywords = "climate policy instruments, intertemporal cooperation, climate change, experiments",
author = "Sebastian Dengler and Reyer Gerlagh and Trautmann, {Stefan T.} and {Van De Kuilen}, Gijs",
year = "2018",
month = "11",
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doi = "10.1016/j.jeem.2018.10.004",
language = "English",
volume = "92",
pages = "331--343",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
publisher = "ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE",

}

Climate policy commitment devices. / Dengler, Sebastian; Gerlagh, Reyer; Trautmann, Stefan T.; Van De Kuilen, Gijs.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 92, 01.11.2018, p. 331-343.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

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AU - Dengler, Sebastian

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AU - Trautmann, Stefan T.

AU - Van De Kuilen, Gijs

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N2 - We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.

AB - We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.

KW - climate policy instruments

KW - intertemporal cooperation

KW - climate change

KW - experiments

U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.10.004

DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2018.10.004

M3 - Article

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SP - 331

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JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

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