Abstract
We develop a dynamic resource extraction game that mimics the global multi-generation planning problem for climate change and fossil fuel extraction. We implement the game under different conditions in the laboratory. Compared to a baseline condition, we find that policy interventions that provide a costly commitment device or reduce climate threshold uncertainty reduce resource extraction. We also study two conditions to assess the underlying social preferences and the viability of ecological dictatorship. Our results suggest that climate change policies that focus on investments that lock the economy into carbon-free energy sources provide an important commitment device in the intertemporal cooperation problem.
Original language | English |
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Pages (from-to) | 331-343 |
Journal | Journal of Environmental Economics and Management |
Volume | 92 |
DOIs | |
Publication status | Published - 1 Nov 2018 |
Keywords
- climate policy instruments
- intertemporal cooperation
- climate change
- experiments
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Data for: Climate Policy Commitment Devices
Gerlagh, R. (Creator), Dengler, S. (Creator), Trautmann, S. (Creator) & van de Kuilen, G. (Creator), Mendeley Data, 29 Oct 2018
DOI: 10.17632/kk7wg4c9ym.1, https://data.mendeley.com/datasets/kk7wg4c9ym
Dataset