Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

T. Ten Raa, R.P. Gilles

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Abstract

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages13
Volume2000-08
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-08

Keywords

  • clubs
  • club efficiency
  • Lindahl equilibrium
  • limit cores

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    Ten Raa, T., & Gilles, R. P. (2000). Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-08). Macroeconomics.