Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

T. Ten Raa, R.P. Gilles

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMacroeconomics
Number of pages13
Volume2000-08
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-08

Fingerprint

Lindahl equilibrium
Clubs
Efficient allocation
Nature
Equivalence
Core allocation

Keywords

  • clubs
  • club efficiency
  • Lindahl equilibrium
  • limit cores

Cite this

Ten Raa, T., & Gilles, R. P. (2000). Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-08). Tilburg: Macroeconomics.
Ten Raa, T. ; Gilles, R.P. / Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods. Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Ten Raa, T & Gilles, RP 2000 'Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2000-08, Macroeconomics, Tilburg.

Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods. / Ten Raa, T.; Gilles, R.P.

Tilburg : Macroeconomics, 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2000-08).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

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AU - Gilles, R.P.

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N2 - Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.

AB - Limit core allocations are the ones that remain in the core of a replicated economy. An equivalent notion for economies with public goods is Schweizer's club efficiency. We extend this notion to economies with goods that have a semi-public nature. The notion encompasses purely private as well as purely public club goods as polar cases. We show that given certain conditions the equivalence of club efficient allocations and Lindahl equilibria holds for a wide range of economies with semi-public club goods. We also show that extension to a more general class of economies seems implausible.

KW - clubs

KW - club efficiency

KW - Lindahl equilibrium

KW - limit cores

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2000-08

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods

PB - Macroeconomics

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Ten Raa T, Gilles RP. Club Efficiency and Lindahl Equilibrium with Semi-Public Goods. Tilburg: Macroeconomics. 2000. (CentER Discussion Paper).