We present a two-stage model for the decision making process of financial analysts when issuing earnings forecasts. In the first stage, financial analysts perform a fundamental earnings analysis in which they are, potentially, subject to a behavioral bias. In the second stage analysts can adjust their earnings forecast in line with their strategic incentives. The paper analyzes this decision process throughout the forecasting period and explains the underlying drivers. Using quarterly earnings forecasts, we document that throughout the entire forecasting period financial analysts overweight their private information. At the same time, financial analysts behave strategically. They issue initial optimistic forecasts by strategically inflating their forecast. In their last revision, they become pessimistic and strategically deflate their earnings forecast, which creates the possibility of a positive earnings surprise. This analysis of the dynamics of the decision process provides empirical evidence on the coexistence of overconfidence and strategic incentives.
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Number of pages||42|
|Publication status||Published - 2009|
|Name||CentER Discussion Paper|
- Financial analysts
- Earnings Forecasts
- Conflicts of interest