Abstract
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Title of host publication | International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain (ILS 2016 |
| Subtitle of host publication | Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain |
| Publisher | Springer Verlag |
| Pages | 125-137 |
| ISBN (Print) | 9783319737577 |
| DOIs | |
| Publication status | Published - 2018 |
| Externally published | Yes |
Publication series
| Name | Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing |
|---|---|
| Volume | 262 |
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Collaborative shipping under information distortion. / Padilla Tinoco, Silvia Valeria; Spiliotopoulou, Eirini; Boute, Robert.
International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain (ILS 2016: Information Systems, Logistics, and Supply Chain. Springer Verlag, 2018. p. 125-137 (Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing; Vol. 262).Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceeding › Chapter › Scientific › peer-review
TY - CHAP
T1 - Collaborative shipping under information distortion
AU - Padilla Tinoco, Silvia Valeria
AU - Spiliotopoulou, Eirini
AU - Boute, Robert
PY - 2018
Y1 - 2018
N2 - © Springer International Publishing AG 2018. We examine the incentives for a firm to provide non-truthful demand information under a two-company shipping collaboration. We analyze how distorted demand reporting impacts the logistics costs of each individual company in the collaboration and how this impacts the stability of the collaboration agreement. We find that when the cost allocation proportions are agreed ex-ante based on the reported demand, companies have an incentive to deflate their demand when simple cost allocation rules are used; only when the Shapley value is in place, companies have no incentive to distort their demand information. When the cost allocation proportions are calculated ex-post, based on realized demand, the truth-telling strategy is dominant when the Shapley value or an allocation rule based on the demand or stand-alone costs is in place.
AB - © Springer International Publishing AG 2018. We examine the incentives for a firm to provide non-truthful demand information under a two-company shipping collaboration. We analyze how distorted demand reporting impacts the logistics costs of each individual company in the collaboration and how this impacts the stability of the collaboration agreement. We find that when the cost allocation proportions are agreed ex-ante based on the reported demand, companies have an incentive to deflate their demand when simple cost allocation rules are used; only when the Shapley value is in place, companies have no incentive to distort their demand information. When the cost allocation proportions are calculated ex-post, based on realized demand, the truth-telling strategy is dominant when the Shapley value or an allocation rule based on the demand or stand-alone costs is in place.
U2 - 10.1007/978-3-319-73758-4_9
DO - 10.1007/978-3-319-73758-4_9
M3 - Chapter
SN - 9783319737577
T3 - Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing
SP - 125
EP - 137
BT - International Conference on Information Systems, Logistics and Supply Chain (ILS 2016
PB - Springer Verlag
ER -