Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt

U. Hege, P. Mella-Barral

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Abstract

Debt with many creditors is analyzed in a continuous-time pricing model of the levered firm. We specifically allow for debtor opportunism vis-a-vis a non-coordinated group of creditors, in form of repeated strategic renegotiation offers and default threats. We show that the creditors' initial entitlement to non-collateralized assets will be expropriated through exchange offers. Exchange offers successively increase the level of collateral until all assets are fully collateralized. The ex ante optimal debt contract is neither fully collateralized nor without any collateral. Diffusely held debt allows for a larger debt capacity and bears lower credit risk premia than privately held debt. We derive simple closed-form solutions for the value of equity and defaultable bonds. Numerical estimates show that the bond valuation is very sensitive to the correct specification of the debt renegotiation model.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherFinance
Number of pages44
Volume1999-94
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-94

Keywords

  • Debt reorganization
  • multiple creditors

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    Hege, U., & Mella-Barral, P. (1999). Collateral, Renegotiation and the Value of Diffusely Held Debt. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-94). Finance.