@techreport{9e2ed682218445cb9cd66a6b0fdf7f4d,
title = "Competition, Collusion and Spatial Sales Patterns - Theory and Evidence",
abstract = "We study competition in markets with transport costs and capacity constraints. We compare the outcomes of price competition and coordination in a theoretical model and find that when firms compete, they more often serve more distant customers who are closer to the competitor{\textquoteright}s plant. If firms compete, the transport distance varies in the degree of overcapacity, but not if they coordinate their sales. Using a rich micro-level data set of the cement industry in Germany, we study a cartel breakdown to identify the effect of competition on transport distances. Our econometric analyses confirm the theoretical predictions.",
keywords = "Capacity constraints, cartel, cement, spatial competition, transport costs",
author = "Matthias Hunold and Kai H{\"u}schelrath and Ulrich Laitenberger and Johannes Muthers",
year = "2018",
month = jan,
day = "9",
doi = "10.2139/ssrn.3098764",
language = "English",
series = "ZEW - Centre for European Economic Research Discussion Paper",
publisher = "ZEW Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ",
number = "17-035",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "ZEW Leibniz Centre for European Economic Research ",
}