Competition for status creates superstars

An experiment on public good provision and network formation

Boris van Leeuwen, Theo Offerman, Arthur Schram

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.
Original languageEnglish
JournalJournal of the European Economic Association
DOIs
Publication statusE-pub ahead of print - Feb 2019

Fingerprint

Social preferences
Network formation
Repeated games
Experiment
Network formation games
Efficiency gains
Superstar
Rent
Group size
Laboratory experiments

Cite this

@article{41411e52b9854c08905abfcbb33a51c6,
title = "Competition for status creates superstars: An experiment on public good provision and network formation",
abstract = "We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.",
author = "{van Leeuwen}, Boris and Theo Offerman and Arthur Schram",
year = "2019",
month = "2",
doi = "10.1093/jeea/jvz001",
language = "English",
journal = "Journal of the European Economic Association",
issn = "1542-4774",
publisher = "Wiley-Blackwell",

}

Competition for status creates superstars : An experiment on public good provision and network formation. / van Leeuwen, Boris; Offerman, Theo; Schram, Arthur.

In: Journal of the European Economic Association, 02.2019.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Competition for status creates superstars

T2 - An experiment on public good provision and network formation

AU - van Leeuwen, Boris

AU - Offerman, Theo

AU - Schram, Arthur

PY - 2019/2

Y1 - 2019/2

N2 - We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.

AB - We investigate a mechanism that facilitates the provision of public goods in a network formation game. We show how competition for status encourages a core player to realize efficiency gains for the entire group. In a laboratory experiment we systematically examine the effects of group size and exogenously monetarized status rents. The experimental results provide very clear support for the concept of challenge-freeness, a refinement that predicts when a repeated game equilibrium will be played, and if so which one. Two control treatments allow us to reject the possibility that these observations are driven by social preferences, independently of the competition for status.

U2 - 10.1093/jeea/jvz001

DO - 10.1093/jeea/jvz001

M3 - Article

JO - Journal of the European Economic Association

JF - Journal of the European Economic Association

SN - 1542-4774

ER -