Competition Leverage

How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment

M. Bijlsma, J. Boone, Gijsbert Zwart

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences among consumers. Consequently, the outcome is not efficient even if cost differences are fully compensated. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate for serving high-risk agents to take into account the difference in mark- ups among the two types. Second, the difference in switching behavior creates a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies to high and low types increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low-risk market to the less elastic high-risk market. Finally, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus even further, at the cost of efficiency.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconomics
Volume2011-071
Publication statusPublished - 2011

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2011-071

Fingerprint

Risk adjustment
Leverage
Market risk
Insurer
Consumer welfare
Consumer risk
Costs
Insurance market
Markups
Trade-offs
Health insurance
Subsidies
Incentives
Consumer surplus
Pooling
Switching behavior

Keywords

  • health insurance
  • risk adjustment
  • imperfect competition
  • leverage

Cite this

Bijlsma, M., Boone, J., & Zwart, G. (2011). Competition Leverage: How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-071). Tilburg: Economics.
Bijlsma, M. ; Boone, J. ; Zwart, Gijsbert. / Competition Leverage : How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment. Tilburg : Economics, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Bijlsma, M, Boone, J & Zwart, G 2011 'Competition Leverage: How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2011-071, Economics, Tilburg.

Competition Leverage : How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment. / Bijlsma, M.; Boone, J.; Zwart, Gijsbert.

Tilburg : Economics, 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2011-071).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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AB - We study optimal risk adjustment in imperfectly competitive health insurance markets when high-risk consumers are less likely to switch insurer than low-risk consumers. First, we find that insurers still have an incentive to select even if risk adjustment perfectly corrects for cost differences among consumers. Consequently, the outcome is not efficient even if cost differences are fully compensated. To achieve first best, risk adjustment should overcompensate for serving high-risk agents to take into account the difference in mark- ups among the two types. Second, the difference in switching behavior creates a trade off between efficiency and consumer welfare. Reducing the difference in risk adjustment subsidies to high and low types increases consumer welfare by leveraging competition from the elastic low-risk market to the less elastic high-risk market. Finally, mandatory pooling can increase consumer surplus even further, at the cost of efficiency.

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Bijlsma M, Boone J, Zwart G. Competition Leverage: How the Demand Side Affects Optimal Risk Adjustment. Tilburg: Economics. 2011. (CentER Discussion Paper).