Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game

N. Sun, W. Trockel, Z.F. Yang

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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    Abstract

    In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.
    Original languageEnglish
    Place of PublicationTilburg
    PublisherOperations research
    Number of pages16
    Volume2004-93
    Publication statusPublished - 2004

    Publication series

    NameCentER Discussion Paper
    Volume2004-93

    Fingerprint

    Coalition formation
    Transferable utility games
    Coalition structure
    General equilibrium theory
    Production economies

    Keywords

    • game theory
    • cooperative games
    • general equilibrium

    Cite this

    Sun, N., Trockel, W., & Yang, Z. F. (2004). Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-93). Tilburg: Operations research.
    Sun, N. ; Trockel, W. ; Yang, Z.F. / Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game. Tilburg : Operations research, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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    title = "Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game",
    abstract = "In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.",
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    Sun, N, Trockel, W & Yang, ZF 2004 'Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2004-93, Operations research, Tilburg.

    Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game. / Sun, N.; Trockel, W.; Yang, Z.F.

    Tilburg : Operations research, 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-93).

    Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

    TY - UNPB

    T1 - Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game

    AU - Sun, N.

    AU - Trockel, W.

    AU - Yang, Z.F.

    N1 - Subsequently published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008 Pagination: 16

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    N2 - In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.

    AB - In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.

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    KW - cooperative games

    KW - general equilibrium

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    VL - 2004-93

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    PB - Operations research

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    ER -

    Sun N, Trockel W, Yang ZF. Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game. Tilburg: Operations research. 2004. (CentER Discussion Paper).