### Abstract

Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Tilburg |

Publisher | Operations research |

Number of pages | 16 |

Volume | 2004-93 |

Publication status | Published - 2004 |

### Publication series

Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
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Volume | 2004-93 |

### Fingerprint

### Keywords

- game theory
- cooperative games
- general equilibrium

### Cite this

*Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game*. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2004-93). Tilburg: Operations research.

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**Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game.** / Sun, N.; Trockel, W.; Yang, Z.F.

Research output: Working paper › Discussion paper › Other research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game

AU - Sun, N.

AU - Trockel, W.

AU - Yang, Z.F.

N1 - Subsequently published in Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2008 Pagination: 16

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.

AB - In this paper we study competitive outcomes and endogenous coalition formation in a cooperative n-person transferable utility (TU) game from the viewpoint of general equilibrium theory.For any given game, we construct a competitive exchange coalition production economy corresponding to the game. First, it is shown that the full core of a TU game is not empty if and only if the completion of the game is balanced.The full core is defined free of any particular coalition structure and the coalitions of the game emerge endogenously from the full core.Second, it is shown that the full core of a completionbalanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy and that the coalition structures of the game are endogenously determined by the equilibrium outcomes of the economy.As a consequence, the core of a balanced general TU game coincides with the set of equilibrium payoff vectors of its corresponding economy.

KW - game theory

KW - cooperative games

KW - general equilibrium

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2004-93

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Competitive Outcomes and Endogenous Coalition Formation in an n-Person Game

PB - Operations research

CY - Tilburg

ER -