Compromise Stable TU-Games

M. Quant, P.E.M. Borm, J.H. Reijnierse, S. van Velzen

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Abstract

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages23
Volume2003-55
Publication statusPublished - 2003

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2003-55

Keywords

  • game theory
  • bankruptcy

Cite this

Quant, M., Borm, P. E. M., Reijnierse, J. H., & van Velzen, S. (2003). Compromise Stable TU-Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2003-55). Operations research.