Compromise Stable TU-Games

M. Quant; P.E.M. Borm; J.H. Reijnierse; S. van Velzen

Compromise Stable TU-Games

M. Quant, P.E.M. Borm, J.H. Reijnierse, S. van Velzen

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Abstract

In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.

Original language	English
Place of Publication	Tilburg
Publisher	Operations research
Number of pages	23
Volume	2003-55
Publication status	Published - 2003

Publication series

Name	CentER Discussion Paper
Volume	2003-55

Keywords

game theory
bankruptcy

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title = "Compromise Stable TU-Games",

abstract = "In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.",

keywords = "game theory, bankruptcy",

author = "M. Quant and P.E.M. Borm and J.H. Reijnierse and {van Velzen}, S.",

note = "Pagination: 23",

year = "2003",

language = "English",

volume = "2003-55",

series = "CentER Discussion Paper",

publisher = "Operations research",

type = "WorkingPaper",

institution = "Operations research",

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TY - UNPB

T1 - Compromise Stable TU-Games

AU - Quant, M.

AU - Borm, P.E.M.

AU - Reijnierse, J.H.

AU - van Velzen, S.

N1 - Pagination: 23

PY - 2003

Y1 - 2003

N2 - In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.

AB - In this paper we characterize the class of games for which the core coincides with the core cover (compromise stable games).Moreover we will develop an easy explicit formula for the nucleolus for this class of games, using an approach based on bankruptcy problems.Also the class of convex compromise stable games is characterized.The relation between core cover andWeber set is studied and it is proved that under a weak condition their intersection is nonempty.

KW - game theory

KW - bankruptcy

M3 - Discussion paper

VL - 2003-55

T3 - CentER Discussion Paper

BT - Compromise Stable TU-Games

PB - Operations research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Compromise Stable TU-Games

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