Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form

E. Fukuda, S.H. Tijs, R. Brânzei, S. Muto

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Abstract

In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced.For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation.It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages13
Volume2002-117
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2002-117

Keywords

  • game theory

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    Fukuda, E., Tijs, S. H., Brânzei, R., & Muto, S. (2002). Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2002-117). Microeconomics.