@techreport{9374032aefac43dda3db785b3163ff05,
title = "Compromising in Partition Function Form Games and Cooperation in Perfect Extensive Form",
abstract = "In this paper reasonable payoff intervals for players in a game in partition function form (p.f.f.game) are introduced and used to define the notion of compromisable p.f.f. game.For a compromisable p.f.f. game a compromise value is defined for which an axiomatic characterization is provided.Also a generic subclass of games in extensive form of perfect information without chance moves is introduced.For this class of perfect extensive form games there is a natural credible way to define a p.f.f. game if the players consider cooperation.It turns out that the p.f.f. games obtained in this way are compromisable.",
keywords = "game theory",
author = "E. Fukuda and S.H. Tijs and R. Br{\^a}nzei and S. Muto",
note = "Pagination: 13",
year = "2002",
language = "English",
volume = "2002-117",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}