Cones of Games arising from Market Entry Problems

R. Brânzei, S.H. Tijs, J.B. Timmer

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Abstract

Market entry situations are modelled, where an entrepreneur has to decide for a collection of markets which market to enter and which not. The entrepreneur can improve his prior information by making use of a group of informants, each of them knowing the situation in one or more markets. For such a market entry situation a related cooperative game is introduced, which can be helpful in dealing with the question of how to share the reward of cooperation. The games arising turn out to be elements of the cone of information market games which were introduced for another economic context. This implies that the cooperative solutions of these games have interesting properties. Extra attention is paid to the subcone of information market games arising from market entry situations where for each market only one informant knows the state of the market.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages8
Volume2000-44
Publication statusPublished - 2000

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2000-44

Keywords

  • cooperative games
  • information market entry
  • information market games

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