Congestion Games and Potentials Reconsidered

M. Voorneveld, P.E.M. Borm, F.J.C. van Megen, S.H. Tijs, G. Facchini

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Abstract

In congestion games, players use facilities from a common pool. The benefit that a player derives from using a facility depends, possibly among other things, on the number of users of this facility. The paper gives an easy alternative proof of the isomorphism between exact potential games and the set of congestion games introduced by Rosenthal (1973). It clarifies the relations between existing models on congestion games, and studies a class of congestion games where the sets of Nash equilibria, strong Nash equilibria and potential-maximizing strategies coincide. Particular emphasis is on the computation of potential-maximizing strategies.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages21
Volume1999-98
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-98

Keywords

  • potential games
  • congestion
  • strong Nash equilibrium
  • potential-maximizing strategies

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