Abstract
can be formulated as a consistency axiom on its own right. We nd that two of these conditions are compatible with reinforcement. In fact, one of these, called composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners, turns out to characterize a class of scoring rules which contains the Plurality
rule. When combined with a requirement of monotonicity, composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners uniquely characterizes the Plurality rule. A second implication of composition-consistency
leads to a class of scoring rules that always select a Plurality winner when combined with monotonicity.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Journal | International Journal of Game Theory |
| Publication status | Accepted/In press - 2020 |
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Consistency of scoring rules: A reinvestigation of composition-consistency. / Öztürk, Emel.
In: International Journal of Game Theory, 2020.Research output: Contribution to journal › Article › Scientific › peer-review
TY - JOUR
T1 - Consistency of scoring rules: A reinvestigation of composition-consistency
AU - Öztürk, Emel
PY - 2020
Y1 - 2020
N2 - We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters vary. Two fundamental axioms of consistency in such a setting, reinforcement and composition-consistency, are incompatible. We first observe that the latter implies four conditions each of whichcan be formulated as a consistency axiom on its own right. We nd that two of these conditions are compatible with reinforcement. In fact, one of these, called composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners, turns out to characterize a class of scoring rules which contains the Pluralityrule. When combined with a requirement of monotonicity, composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners uniquely characterizes the Plurality rule. A second implication of composition-consistencyleads to a class of scoring rules that always select a Plurality winner when combined with monotonicity.
AB - We consider a collective choice problem in which the number of alternatives and the number of voters vary. Two fundamental axioms of consistency in such a setting, reinforcement and composition-consistency, are incompatible. We first observe that the latter implies four conditions each of whichcan be formulated as a consistency axiom on its own right. We nd that two of these conditions are compatible with reinforcement. In fact, one of these, called composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners, turns out to characterize a class of scoring rules which contains the Pluralityrule. When combined with a requirement of monotonicity, composition-consistency with respect to non-clone winners uniquely characterizes the Plurality rule. A second implication of composition-consistencyleads to a class of scoring rules that always select a Plurality winner when combined with monotonicity.
M3 - Article
JO - International Journal of Game Theory
JF - International Journal of Game Theory
SN - 0020-7276
ER -