Abstract
This paper axiomatically studies the equal split-off set (cf. Branzei et al. (2006))
as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility. This solution extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for convex games to arbitrary games. By deriving several characterizations, we explore the relation of the equal split-off set with various consistency notions.
as a solution for cooperative games with transferable utility. This solution extends the well-known Dutta and Ray (1989) solution for convex games to arbitrary games. By deriving several characterizations, we explore the relation of the equal split-off set with various consistency notions.
Original language | English |
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Place of Publication | Tilburg |
Publisher | CentER, Center for Economic Research |
Number of pages | 19 |
Volume | 2019-023 |
Publication status | Published - 11 Jun 2019 |
Publication series
Name | CentER Discussion Paper |
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Volume | 2019-023 |
Keywords
- transferable utility games
- egalitrianism
- equal split-off set
- consistency