Contests for public goods

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

Abstract

In this dissertation I examine group contests for both endogenous and exogenous public goods. Three studies jointly illustrate that participants accede to a pernicious one-upping in order to outdo the competing party. This tendency to over-contribute in (group) contest games complements earlier studies. Taking extant contributions in that field into account I investigate the role of fundamental institutions, which have been characterised as vehicles to promote cooperation towards a more efficient strategy in cooperative games. The results of my studies, however, paint a grim picture of the role of these simple institutions – such as rewarding and punishment, free form text communication or wealth redistribution – in group contest games. Unequivocally, players use them to push groupmates to intensify the between-group contest and add insult to injury.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Maastricht University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Riedl, Arno, Promotor, External person
  • Strobel, Martin, Co-promotor, External person
Award date19 Apr 2017
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9789461673060
Publication statusPublished - 19 Apr 2017

Keywords

  • Contests
  • Experiment
  • Institutions

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