Contractual Corporate Governance

M. Goergen, L.D.R. Renneboog

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

Companies have the choice to deviate from their national corporate governance standards by opting into another system. They can do so via contractual devices – such as cross-border mergers and acquisitions, (re)incorporations, and cross-listings – which enable firms to choose their preferred level of investor protection and regulation. This paper reviews these three main contractual governance devices, their effect on value, and whether their adoption by firms induces a race to the bottom or a race to the top. Indeed, firms may opt for less shareholder-orientation or investor protection (shareholder-expropriation hypothesis) rather than for more stringent rules that require firms to focus on shareholder value (bonding hypothesis).
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherFinance
Number of pages35
Volume2008-41
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-41

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Corporate governance
Investor protection
Shareholders
Governance
Cross-border mergers and acquisitions
Shareholder value
Bonding hypothesis
Cross-listing
Race to the bottom
Expropriation

Keywords

  • Contractual corporate governance
  • corporate governance regulation
  • cross-border mergers and acquisitions
  • cross-listings
  • reincorporations
  • shareholder protection
  • creditor protection
  • spillover effects

Cite this

Goergen, M., & Renneboog, L. D. R. (2008). Contractual Corporate Governance. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-41). Tilburg: Finance.
Goergen, M. ; Renneboog, L.D.R. / Contractual Corporate Governance. Tilburg : Finance, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Goergen, M & Renneboog, LDR 2008 'Contractual Corporate Governance' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2008-41, Finance, Tilburg.

Contractual Corporate Governance. / Goergen, M.; Renneboog, L.D.R.

Tilburg : Finance, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-41).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Goergen M, Renneboog LDR. Contractual Corporate Governance. Tilburg: Finance. 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).