Cooperation, compensation and transition

Y. Ju

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

327 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own direct interests to obtain higher payoffs for the coalition as a whole. This thesis first introduces and analyses a new solution concept, the consensus value, for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form and generalises it to partition function form games. These ideas and concepts are used to analyse several problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing: the general framework of project-allocation situations and the problem of externality-associated compensations within the new model of primeval games. Finally, transition by compensation is analysed in the framework of transition economies and, in particular, in the reform process of China.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Ruys, Pieter, Promotor
  • Borm, Peter, Promotor
Award date15 Dec 2004
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs9056681397
Publication statusPublished - 2004

Fingerprint

Surplus sharing
Game form
Reform process
China
Transition economies
Economics
Externalities
Incentives
Characteristic function
Cooperative game
Solution concepts
Transferable utility

Cite this

Ju, Y. (2004). Cooperation, compensation and transition. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Ju, Y.. / Cooperation, compensation and transition. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2004. 160 p.
@phdthesis{1c03cb9e170c43fba37a5bd945d8d39d,
title = "Cooperation, compensation and transition",
abstract = "Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own direct interests to obtain higher payoffs for the coalition as a whole. This thesis first introduces and analyses a new solution concept, the consensus value, for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form and generalises it to partition function form games. These ideas and concepts are used to analyse several problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing: the general framework of project-allocation situations and the problem of externality-associated compensations within the new model of primeval games. Finally, transition by compensation is analysed in the framework of transition economies and, in particular, in the reform process of China.",
author = "Y. Ju",
year = "2004",
language = "English",
isbn = "9056681397",
series = "CentER Dissertation Series",
publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",
school = "Tilburg University",

}

Ju, Y 2004, 'Cooperation, compensation and transition', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Cooperation, compensation and transition. / Ju, Y.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2004. 160 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

TY - THES

T1 - Cooperation, compensation and transition

AU - Ju, Y.

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own direct interests to obtain higher payoffs for the coalition as a whole. This thesis first introduces and analyses a new solution concept, the consensus value, for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form and generalises it to partition function form games. These ideas and concepts are used to analyse several problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing: the general framework of project-allocation situations and the problem of externality-associated compensations within the new model of primeval games. Finally, transition by compensation is analysed in the framework of transition economies and, in particular, in the reform process of China.

AB - Cooperation and compensation are two important and well-linked issues in economics. The central question in cooperation is how to share the joint gains among participating players. Compensation is a specific aspect of surplus sharing problems providing incentives for agents to sacrifice their own direct interests to obtain higher payoffs for the coalition as a whole. This thesis first introduces and analyses a new solution concept, the consensus value, for cooperative games with transferable utility in characteristic function form and generalises it to partition function form games. These ideas and concepts are used to analyse several problems of loss compensation and surplus sharing: the general framework of project-allocation situations and the problem of externality-associated compensations within the new model of primeval games. Finally, transition by compensation is analysed in the framework of transition economies and, in particular, in the reform process of China.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 9056681397

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Ju Y. Cooperation, compensation and transition. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2004. 160 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).