Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game

A framed field experiment

Charles Noussair, Daan van Soest, J.T.R. Stoop

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We derive a dynamic theoretical model of renewable resource extraction. In the social optimum, maximum extraction occurs in the last period only, while in the unique subgame perfect Nash equilibrium, the resource is depleted immediately. The predictions are tested in a field experiment conducted at a recreational fishing pond. The subjects, experienced recreational fishermen, face a dynamic social dilemma, in which they risk depletion of the resource by overfishing. We find strong support for the Nash equilibrium. Fishermen exert as much effort in the last period as in preceding periods, and effort is independent of the stock of fish.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)408-413
JournalAmerican Economic Review
Volume105
Issue number5
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 5 May 2015

Fingerprint

Fishing
Field experiment
Resources
Prediction
Recreational fishing
Nash equilibrium
Resource extraction
Fish
Depletion
Social dilemma
Subgame perfect Nash equilibrium
Renewable resources
Overfishing
Social optimum

Keywords

  • Cooperative games
  • Field experiments
  • Renewable resources and conservation

Cite this

Noussair, Charles ; van Soest, Daan ; Stoop, J.T.R. / Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game : A framed field experiment. In: American Economic Review. 2015 ; Vol. 105, No. 5. pp. 408-413.
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Cooperation in a dynamic fishing game : A framed field experiment. / Noussair, Charles; van Soest, Daan; Stoop, J.T.R.

In: American Economic Review, Vol. 105, No. 5, 05.05.2015, p. 408-413.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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