Cooperation in Dividing the Cake

M. Dall'Aglio, R. Brânzei, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper defines models of cooperation among players partition- ing a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players' ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooper- ating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the di- vision.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages22
Volume2008-101
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-101

Keywords

  • fair division
  • cooperative games
  • maximin partition

Cite this

Dall'Aglio, M., Brânzei, R., & Tijs, S. H. (2008). Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-101). Tilburg: Operations research.
Dall'Aglio, M. ; Brânzei, R. ; Tijs, S.H. / Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. Tilburg : Operations research, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Dall'Aglio, M, Brânzei, R & Tijs, SH 2008 'Cooperation in Dividing the Cake' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2008-101, Operations research, Tilburg.

Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. / Dall'Aglio, M.; Brânzei, R.; Tijs, S.H.

Tilburg : Operations research, 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-101).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Dall'Aglio M, Brânzei R, Tijs SH. Cooperation in Dividing the Cake. Tilburg: Operations research. 2008. (CentER Discussion Paper).