Cooperation in dividing the cake

R. Brânzei, M. Dall'Aglio, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

This paper defines models of cooperation among players partitioning a completely divisible good (such as a cake or a piece of land). The novelty of our approach lies in the players’ ability to form coalitions before the actual division of the good with the aim to maximize the average utility of the coalition. A social welfare function which takes into account coalitions drives the division. In addition, we derive a cooperative game which measures the performance of each coalition. This game is compared with the game in which players start cooperating only after the good has been portioned and has been allocated among the players. We show that a modified version of the game played before the division outperforms the game played after the division.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)417-432
JournalTop
Volume17
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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Coalitions
Division
Game
Cooperative Game
Welfare
Divisible
Partitioning
Maximise
Model

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Brânzei, R., Dall'Aglio, M., & Tijs, S. H. (2009). Cooperation in dividing the cake. Top, 17(2), 417-432.
Brânzei, R. ; Dall'Aglio, M. ; Tijs, S.H. / Cooperation in dividing the cake. In: Top. 2009 ; Vol. 17, No. 2. pp. 417-432.
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Brânzei, R, Dall'Aglio, M & Tijs, SH 2009, 'Cooperation in dividing the cake', Top, vol. 17, no. 2, pp. 417-432.

Cooperation in dividing the cake. / Brânzei, R.; Dall'Aglio, M.; Tijs, S.H.

In: Top, Vol. 17, No. 2, 2009, p. 417-432.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

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Brânzei R, Dall'Aglio M, Tijs SH. Cooperation in dividing the cake. Top. 2009;17(2):417-432.