Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

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Abstract

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominancesolvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium.We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages23
Volume2006-48
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2006-48

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Experimental games
Strategic complements
Strategic complementarity
Strategic substitutes
Pareto
Substitutability
Nash equilibrium
Laboratory experiments

Keywords

  • experiments
  • cooperation
  • strategic substitutes and complements
  • externalities

Cite this

Potters, J. J. M., & Suetens, S. (2006). Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2006-48). Tilburg: Microeconomics.
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Potters, JJM & Suetens, S 2006 'Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2006-48, Microeconomics, Tilburg.

Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes. / Potters, J.J.M.; Suetens, S.

Tilburg : Microeconomics, 2006. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2006-48).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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