@techreport{7620271d307548edb03bac2594f31ea7,
title = "Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes",
abstract = "Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominancesolvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium.We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes.",
keywords = "experiments, cooperation, strategic substitutes and complements, externalities",
author = "J.J.M. Potters and S. Suetens",
note = "Subsequently published in Review of Economic Studies, 2009 Pagination: 23",
year = "2006",
language = "English",
volume = "2006-48",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Microeconomics",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Microeconomics",
}