Cooperation in Experimental Games of Strategic Complements and Substitutes

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Abstract

Results are reported of a laboratory experiment aimed at examining whether strategic substitutability and strategic complementarity have an impact on the tendency to cooperate in two-player dominancesolvable games with a Pareto-inefficient Nash equilibrium.We find that there is significantly more cooperation when actions exhibit strategic complementarities than in case of strategic substitutes.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages23
Volume2006-48
Publication statusPublished - 2006

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2006-48

Keywords

  • experiments
  • cooperation
  • strategic substitutes and complements
  • externalities

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