Abstract
This dissertation deals with two topics that arise when transportation companies cooperate. The first chapters of this dissertation focus on a cooperation structure used in practice. In this structure, the companies agree on a pricing mechanism for which each company can outsource orders to other members of the structure. The chapters analyze what the pricing mechanism should be and which orders a company should outsource.
When cooperating, the companies often have less costs which result in gains. But how should these gains be divided over the companies? Cooperative game theory provides divisions. The focus of the second part is on a new proportional solution concept, the proportionate nucleolus, and a new bankruptcy rule, the clights rule.
When cooperating, the companies often have less costs which result in gains. But how should these gains be divided over the companies? Cooperative game theory provides divisions. The focus of the second part is on a new proportional solution concept, the proportionate nucleolus, and a new bankruptcy rule, the clights rule.
| Original language | English |
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| Qualification | Doctor of Philosophy |
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| Award date | 22 Apr 2016 |
| Place of Publication | Tilburg |
| Publisher | |
| Print ISBNs | 9789056684716 |
| Publication status | Published - 2016 |