Cooperative Games with Stochastic Payoffs: Determanistic Equivalents

J.P.M. Suijs, P.E.M. Borm

Research output: Book/ReportReport

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This paper focuses on the subclass of cooperative games with stochastic payoffs in which the preferences of the agents are such that a stochastic payoff can be represented by a deterministic equivalent.To each game within this class one can associate a game with deterministic payoffs.It is shown that the core of such a cooperative game with stochastic payoffs is nonempty if and only if the core of the associated game is nonempty.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages14
Publication statusPublished - 1996

Publication series

NameFEW Research Memorandum


  • Preferences
  • Stochastic Processes
  • Cooperative Games


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