Coordinating choice in partial cooperative equilibrium

L. Mallozzi, S.H. Tijs

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

6 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

In this paper we consider symmetric aggregative games and investigate partial cooperation between a portion of the players that sign a cooperative agreement and the rest of the players. Existence results of partial cooperative equilibria are obtained when the players who do not sign the agreement play a Nash equilibrium game having multiple solutions. Some applications in the supermodular case are discussed.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)1465-1473
JournalEconomics Bulletin
Volume29
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - 2009

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