@book{da44944d7d7e484d9818d0dd7dcd8067,
title = "Coordination in continuously repeated games",
abstract = "In this paper we propose a model to describe the effectiveness of coordination in a continuously repeated two-player game. We study how the choice of a decision rule by a coordinator affects the strategic behavior of the players, resulting in more or less cooperation. Our model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear differential game with a one-dimensional state space, and we propose a method to obtain numerically the stationary feedback Nash equilibria for such games. This method is based on solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations directly.",
keywords = "Repeated Games, game theory",
author = "A.J.T.M. Weeren and J.M. Schumacher and J.C. Engwerda",
note = "Pagination: 28",
year = "1995",
language = "English",
volume = "9576",
series = "Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research",
publisher = "Unknown Publisher",
}