Coordination in continuously repeated games

A.J.T.M. Weeren, J.M. Schumacher, J.C. Engwerda

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Abstract

In this paper we propose a model to describe the effectiveness of coordination in a continuously repeated two-player game. We study how the choice of a decision rule by a coordinator affects the strategic behavior of the players, resulting in more or less cooperation. Our model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear differential game with a one-dimensional state space, and we propose a method to obtain numerically the stationary feedback Nash equilibria for such games. This method is based on solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations directly.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages28
Volume9576
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameDiscussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research
Volume9576

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Keywords

  • Repeated Games
  • game theory

Cite this

Weeren, A. J. T. M., Schumacher, J. M., & Engwerda, J. C. (1995). Coordination in continuously repeated games. (Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research; Vol. 9576). Unknown Publisher.
Weeren, A.J.T.M. ; Schumacher, J.M. ; Engwerda, J.C. / Coordination in continuously repeated games. Unknown Publisher, 1995. 28 p. (Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research).
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Weeren, AJTM, Schumacher, JM & Engwerda, JC 1995, Coordination in continuously repeated games. Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research, vol. 9576, vol. 9576, Unknown Publisher.

Coordination in continuously repeated games. / Weeren, A.J.T.M.; Schumacher, J.M.; Engwerda, J.C.

Unknown Publisher, 1995. 28 p. (Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research; Vol. 9576).

Research output: Book/ReportReportProfessional

TY - BOOK

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PY - 1995

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N2 - In this paper we propose a model to describe the effectiveness of coordination in a continuously repeated two-player game. We study how the choice of a decision rule by a coordinator affects the strategic behavior of the players, resulting in more or less cooperation. Our model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear differential game with a one-dimensional state space, and we propose a method to obtain numerically the stationary feedback Nash equilibria for such games. This method is based on solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations directly.

AB - In this paper we propose a model to describe the effectiveness of coordination in a continuously repeated two-player game. We study how the choice of a decision rule by a coordinator affects the strategic behavior of the players, resulting in more or less cooperation. Our model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear differential game with a one-dimensional state space, and we propose a method to obtain numerically the stationary feedback Nash equilibria for such games. This method is based on solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations directly.

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KW - game theory

M3 - Report

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T3 - Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research

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PB - Unknown Publisher

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Weeren AJTM, Schumacher JM, Engwerda JC. Coordination in continuously repeated games. Unknown Publisher, 1995. 28 p. (Discussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research).