Coordination in continuously repeated games

A.J.T.M. Weeren, J.M. Schumacher, J.C. Engwerda

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Abstract

In this paper we propose a model to describe the effectiveness of coordination in a continuously repeated two-player game. We study how the choice of a decision rule by a coordinator affects the strategic behavior of the players, resulting in more or less cooperation. Our model requires the analysis of an infinite-horizon nonlinear differential game with a one-dimensional state space, and we propose a method to obtain numerically the stationary feedback Nash equilibria for such games. This method is based on solving the associated Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equations directly.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages28
Volume9576
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameDiscussion Papers / CentER for Economic Research
Volume9576

Keywords

  • Repeated Games
  • game theory

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