@inproceedings{91ef1e4cccb9484cb9c6e60d3a77da5f,
title = "Coordination of epidemic control policies: A game theoretic perspective",
abstract = "We consider two neighbouring countries in which a pandemic disease spreads. Countries face a trade-off between the social costs of the epidemic diffusion and the monetary costs in order to avoid the insurgence of pandemics. However, due to migration of people across countries, the treatment efforts by one country generate a positive externality for the neighbouring country. Both countries can negotiate on the healthcare cost that each has to sustain. But, they do so subject to a central authority (CA) who can impose penalties to both countries whenever they cannot reach an agreement. We analyse the outcome of such situation via the Nash bargaining concept. Next we show how the CA should design penalties to i) ensure that revealing the true migration flow data is a self-enforcing behaviour, and to ii) enforce that the NB solution adheres to certain fairness properties.",
keywords = "Epidemic games, Mechanism Design, Nash bargaining, Truth revealing",
author = "Lorenzo Maggi and {De Pellegrini}, Francesco and Alexandre Reiffers and P.J.J. Herings and Eitan Altman",
note = "Funding Information: This work has been partially supported by the European Commission within the framework of the CONGAS project FP7-ICT-2011-8-317672. Publisher Copyright: {\textcopyright} 2014 University of Trento.; 7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014 ; Conference date: 29-10-2014 Through 31-10-2014",
year = "2017",
month = jun,
day = "7",
language = "English",
series = "2014 7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014",
publisher = "Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.",
pages = "180--187",
booktitle = "Proceedings of the 7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014",
address = "United States",
}