Coordination of epidemic control policies: A game theoretic perspective

Lorenzo Maggi, Francesco De Pellegrini, Alexandre Reiffers, P. Jean-Jacques Herings, Eitan Altman

Research output: Chapter in Book/Report/Conference proceedingConference contributionScientificpeer-review

2 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We consider two neighbouring countries in which a pandemic disease spreads. Countries face a trade-off between the social costs of the epidemic diffusion and the monetary costs in order to avoid the insurgence of pandemics. However, due to migration of people across countries, the treatment efforts by one country generate a positive externality for the neighbouring country. Both countries can negotiate on the healthcare cost that each has to sustain. But, they do so subject to a central authority (CA) who can impose penalties to both countries whenever they cannot reach an agreement. We analyse the outcome of such situation via the Nash bargaining concept. Next we show how the CA should design penalties to i) ensure that revealing the true migration flow data is a self-enforcing behaviour, and to ii) enforce that the NB solution adheres to certain fairness properties.
Original languageEnglish
Title of host publicationProceedings of the 7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014
PublisherInstitute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers Inc.
Pages180-187
ISBN (Electronic)9788884435743
Publication statusPublished - 7 Jun 2017
Externally publishedYes
Event7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014 - Trento, Italy
Duration: 29 Oct 201431 Oct 2014

Publication series

Name2014 7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014

Conference

Conference7th International Conference on Network Games, Control and Optimization, NetGCoop 2014
Country/TerritoryItaly
CityTrento
Period29/10/1431/10/14

Keywords

  • Epidemic games
  • Mechanism Design
  • Nash bargaining
  • Truth revealing

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