Core Representations of the Standard Fixed Tree Game

M.A.L. Koster, E. Molina, Y. Sprumont, S.H. Tijs

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Abstract

This paper discusses the core of the game corresponding to the standard fixed tree problem. We introduce the concept of a weighted constrained egalitarian solution. The core of the standard fixed tree game equals the set of all weighted constrained egalitarian solutions. The notion of home-down allocation is developed to create further insight in the local behavior of the weighted constrained egalitarian allocation. A similar and dual approach by the notion of down-home allocations gives us the class of weighted Shapley values. The constrained egalitarian solution is characterized in terms of a cost sharing mechanism.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherMicroeconomics
Number of pages27
Volume1998-21
Publication statusPublished - 1998

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1998-21

Keywords

  • Cooperative game theory
  • tree games
  • core
  • weighted constrained egalitarian solution

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