Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games

S.Z. Alparslan-Gok, R. Brânzei, S.H. Tijs

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Abstract

In this paper, interval-type solution concepts for interval-valued cooperative games like the interval core, the interval dominance core and stable sets are introduced and studied. The notion of I-balancedness is introduced, and it is proved that the interval core of an interval-valued cooperative game is nonempty if and only if the game is I-balanced. Relations between the interval core, the dominance core and stable sets of an interval-valued game are established.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherOperations research
Number of pages15
Volume2008-17
Publication statusPublished - 2008

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2008-17

Keywords

  • cooperative games
  • interval games
  • the core
  • the dominance core
  • stable sets

Cite this

Alparslan-Gok, S. Z., Brânzei, R., & Tijs, S. H. (2008). Cores and Stable Sets for Interval-Valued Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2008-17). Operations research.