Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms

P.G.J. Roosenboom

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

230 Downloads (Pure)

Abstract

This thesis studies the use of corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. The IPO often marks the beginning of a more diffuse ownership structure by selling shares to a large group of outside investors. In the thesis corporate governance is viewed as a relevant design issue at the time of the IPO. On the one hand, management may strategically decide to ignore small shareholders' rights and structure corporate governance to its own advantage. This allows management to pursue personal interests that are (possibly) conflicting with those of small shareholders. Alternatively, management may choose to mitigate agency costs by adopting an effective corporate governance structure. In this case, corporate governance is organized to align the interests of management with those of small shareholders. The thesis consists of three studies that examine the use of corporate governance mechanisms by IPO firms in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, respectively.
Original languageEnglish
QualificationDoctor of Philosophy
Awarding Institution
  • Tilburg University
Supervisors/Advisors
  • Kabir, M.R., Co-promotor
  • Moerland, P.W., Promotor
Award date18 Sep 2002
Place of PublicationTilburg
Publisher
Print ISBNs905668101X
Publication statusPublished - 2002

Fingerprint

Corporate governance mechanisms
Corporate governance
Shareholders
Agency costs
Investors
Large groups
Ownership structure
Shareholder rights
Governance structure
France
The Netherlands

Cite this

Roosenboom, P. G. J. (2002). Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.
Roosenboom, P.G.J.. / Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2002. 170 p.
@phdthesis{70d9c4578e984dde89bedf5cd67042a3,
title = "Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms",
abstract = "This thesis studies the use of corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. The IPO often marks the beginning of a more diffuse ownership structure by selling shares to a large group of outside investors. In the thesis corporate governance is viewed as a relevant design issue at the time of the IPO. On the one hand, management may strategically decide to ignore small shareholders' rights and structure corporate governance to its own advantage. This allows management to pursue personal interests that are (possibly) conflicting with those of small shareholders. Alternatively, management may choose to mitigate agency costs by adopting an effective corporate governance structure. In this case, corporate governance is organized to align the interests of management with those of small shareholders. The thesis consists of three studies that examine the use of corporate governance mechanisms by IPO firms in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, respectively.",
author = "P.G.J. Roosenboom",
year = "2002",
language = "English",
isbn = "905668101X",
series = "CentER Dissertation Series",
publisher = "CentER, Center for Economic Research",
school = "Tilburg University",

}

Roosenboom, PGJ 2002, 'Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms', Doctor of Philosophy, Tilburg University, Tilburg.

Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. / Roosenboom, P.G.J.

Tilburg : CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2002. 170 p.

Research output: ThesisDoctoral Thesis

TY - THES

T1 - Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms

AU - Roosenboom, P.G.J.

PY - 2002

Y1 - 2002

N2 - This thesis studies the use of corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. The IPO often marks the beginning of a more diffuse ownership structure by selling shares to a large group of outside investors. In the thesis corporate governance is viewed as a relevant design issue at the time of the IPO. On the one hand, management may strategically decide to ignore small shareholders' rights and structure corporate governance to its own advantage. This allows management to pursue personal interests that are (possibly) conflicting with those of small shareholders. Alternatively, management may choose to mitigate agency costs by adopting an effective corporate governance structure. In this case, corporate governance is organized to align the interests of management with those of small shareholders. The thesis consists of three studies that examine the use of corporate governance mechanisms by IPO firms in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, respectively.

AB - This thesis studies the use of corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. The IPO often marks the beginning of a more diffuse ownership structure by selling shares to a large group of outside investors. In the thesis corporate governance is viewed as a relevant design issue at the time of the IPO. On the one hand, management may strategically decide to ignore small shareholders' rights and structure corporate governance to its own advantage. This allows management to pursue personal interests that are (possibly) conflicting with those of small shareholders. Alternatively, management may choose to mitigate agency costs by adopting an effective corporate governance structure. In this case, corporate governance is organized to align the interests of management with those of small shareholders. The thesis consists of three studies that examine the use of corporate governance mechanisms by IPO firms in the Netherlands, France and the United Kingdom, respectively.

M3 - Doctoral Thesis

SN - 905668101X

T3 - CentER Dissertation Series

PB - CentER, Center for Economic Research

CY - Tilburg

ER -

Roosenboom PGJ. Corporate governance mechanisms in IPO firms. Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research, 2002. 170 p. (CentER Dissertation Series).