Corporate governance of banks and financial stability

D. Anginer, Asli Demirguc-Kunt, Harry Huizinga, Kebin Ma

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

140 Citations (Scopus)


We find that shareholder-friendly corporate governance is associated with higher stand-alone and systemic risk in the banking sector. Specifically, shareholder-friendly corporate governance results in higher risk for larger banks and for banks that are located in countries with generous financial safety nets as banks try to shift risk toward taxpayers. We confirm our findings by comparing banks to nonfinancial firms and examining changes in bank risk around an exogenous regulatory change in governance. Our results underline the importance of the financial safety net and too-big-to-fail guarantees in thinking about corporate governance reforms at banks.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)327-346
JournalJournal of Financial Economics
Issue number2
Publication statusPublished - Nov 2018


  • coporate governance
  • bank insolvency
  • systemic risk


Dive into the research topics of 'Corporate governance of banks and financial stability'. Together they form a unique fingerprint.

Cite this