Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: Theory and evidence

P. Fredriksson, Herman Vollebergh, E. Dijkgraaf

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

Abstract

We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers’ and capital owners’ lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982–1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)207-231
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume47
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

Fingerprint

corruption
energy policy
OECD
energy efficiency
prediction
lobbying
industry
panel data
OECD countries
Corruption
Energy efficiency
Energy policy
cost
energy
Prediction
Industry

Keywords

  • energy policy
  • political economy
  • corruption
  • lobbying
  • industrialized countries
  • industry size
  • collective action

Cite this

@article{e535f80bb314415cba34edf05fb3f9f0,
title = "Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: Theory and evidence",
abstract = "We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers’ and capital owners’ lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982–1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions.",
keywords = "energy policy, political economy, corruption, lobbying, industrialized countries, industry size, collective action",
author = "P. Fredriksson and Herman Vollebergh and E. Dijkgraaf",
year = "2004",
doi = "10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001",
language = "English",
volume = "47",
pages = "207--231",
journal = "Journal of Environmental Economics and Management",
issn = "0095-0696",
publisher = "ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE",
number = "2",

}

Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: Theory and evidence. / Fredriksson, P.; Vollebergh, Herman; Dijkgraaf, E.

In: Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Vol. 47, No. 2, 2004, p. 207-231.

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

TY - JOUR

T1 - Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: Theory and evidence

AU - Fredriksson, P.

AU - Vollebergh, Herman

AU - Dijkgraaf, E.

PY - 2004

Y1 - 2004

N2 - We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers’ and capital owners’ lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982–1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions.

AB - We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers’ and capital owners’ lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982–1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions.

KW - energy policy

KW - political economy

KW - corruption

KW - lobbying

KW - industrialized countries

KW - industry size

KW - collective action

U2 - 10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001

DO - 10.1016/j.jeem.2003.08.001

M3 - Article

VL - 47

SP - 207

EP - 231

JO - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

JF - Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

SN - 0095-0696

IS - 2

ER -