Corruption and energy efficiency in OECD countries: Theory and evidence

P. Fredriksson, Herman Vollebergh, E. Dijkgraaf

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

105 Citations (Scopus)

Abstract

We investigate the effect of corruption and industry sector size on energy policy outcomes. The main predictions of our theory are that: (i) greater corruptibility of policy makers reduces energy policy stringency; (ii) greater lobby group coordination costs (increased industry sector size) results in more stringent energy policy; and (iii) workers’ and capital owners’ lobbying efforts on energy policy are negatively related. These predictions are tested using a unique panel data set on the energy intensity of 11 sectors in 12 OECD countries for years 1982–1996. The evidence generally supports the predictions.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)207-231
JournalJournal of Environmental Economics and Management
Volume47
Issue number2
DOIs
Publication statusPublished - 2004
Externally publishedYes

Keywords

  • energy policy
  • political economy
  • corruption
  • lobbying
  • industrialized countries
  • industry size
  • collective action

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