In many real-life situations where individuals work together in a joint project, joint costs (or profits) occur which have to be shared. The central problem of cost sharing is the allocation of costs in a 'just' way among the participants. Examples are numerous and range from setting fees for the use of a common facility such as (tele)communication networks, water supply systems, power plants, airports and transit systems, to the allocation of joint overhead costs of a firm among its divisions. It is the central issue of this monograph to address the problem of sharing the cost of a particular technology by a group of agents with equal access rights and unequal demands, in the presence of variable returns. Inspired by ideas from game theory and the (axiomatic) literature on distributive justice, this thesis considers solution concepts for homogeneous and heterogeneous cost sharing problems. The first part of the thesis discusses (continuous) cooperative production problems, whereas the second part is devoted to (discrete) cost sharing problems involved with network exploitation.
|Qualification||Doctor of Philosophy|
|Award date||13 Dec 1999|
|Place of Publication||Tilburg|
|Publication status||Published - 1999|