Costly Disclosures in a Voluntary Disclosure Model with an Opponent

J.P.M. Suijs

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Abstract

This paper analyzes voluntary disclosure equilibria when the voluntary disclosure model presented inWAGENHOFER (1990) is modified so as to include fixed disclosure costs as used in VERRECCHIA (1983). It turns out that incorporating both disclosure and proprietary costs rules out full disclosure equilibria. Moreover, it yields additional disclosure equilibria that differ significantly from the equilibria in VERRECCHIA (1983) and WAGENHOFER (1990). Thus, in the extended model the firm is provided with additional incentives to withhold its private information from the public.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherAccounting
Number of pages9
Volume1999-35
Publication statusPublished - 1999

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1999-35

Keywords

  • Voluntary disclosure
  • disclosure costs
  • proprietary costs

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    Suijs, J. P. M. (1999). Costly Disclosures in a Voluntary Disclosure Model with an Opponent. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1999-35). Accounting.