What role should a motivation to do the right thing, read de dicto, play in the life of a virtuous agent? According to a prominent argument from Michael Smith, those who are only ever motivated by such a desire are moral fetishists. Smith’s argument is designed to support motivational judgment internalism, the view that there is a necessary connection between moral judgments and motivation. Smith claims that motivational judgment externalism is committed to an implausible picture of the way in which moral judgments motivate. According to Smith, in order to explain why morally virtuous agents are reliably motivated to act in line with their moral judgments, the externalist must posit the existence of a desire to do the right thing, where this is read de dicto, not de re. This, he claims, is an implausible picture of moral motivation for virtuous agents.
|Number of pages||19|
|Journal||History of Philosophy Quarterly|
|Publication status||Published - 25 Jan 2017|
- Adam Smith
- Moral Philosophy
- Moral Rightness
- Moral Sentiments