Abstract
In this paper we analyse debt stabilization in a monetary union that features endogenous risk premia. In particular, we analyse debt stabilization in two diametrically opposed regimes. In the first regime, the “national fiscal discipline regime”, financial markets impose sovereign risk premia based on each country’s government debt level. In the second regime, the “eurobonds Regime”, financial markets impose a risk premium based on the average debt level in the monetary union. We compare outcomes in both regimes using simulations of a number of relevant scenarios.
| Original language | English |
|---|---|
| Place of Publication | Munich |
| Publisher | CESifo Working Papers |
| Number of pages | 23 |
| Volume | 5564 |
| Publication status | Published - Oct 2015 |
Publication series
| Name | CESifo Working Paper |
|---|---|
| Volume | 5564 |
UN SDGs
This output contributes to the following UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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SDG 17 Partnerships for the Goals
Keywords
- Eurobonds
- sovereign debt sustainability
- sovereign debt crisis
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