Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia

J.C. Engwerda, B. van Aarle, J.E.J. Plasmans, A.J.T.M. Weeren

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Abstract

Abstract: As a result of the recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession, fiscal deficits have soared in many OECD countries. As a consequence, government debt has been on the rise again after a period of stable or declining government debt. In this paper we analyze debt stabilization in a country that features endogenous risk premia, imposed by financial markets that evaluate the probability of debt default by governments. Endogenous risk premia arise by assuming e.g. simple linear relations between risk premia and the level of debt. As a result the real interest rate on government debt can be written as a constant (measuring the risk-free real interest rate corrected for real output growth) plus an endogenous risk premium that depends on the debt level. We bring such endogenous risk premia into the Tabellini (1986) model [22] and analyze the impact of it. This gives rise to a nonlinear differential game. We solve this game for both a cooperative setting and a non-cooperative setting. The non-cooperative game is solved under an open-loop information structure. In particular we present a bifurcation analysis w.r.t. the risk premium parameter.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherEconometrics
Number of pages32
Volume2012-056
Publication statusPublished - 2012

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2012-056

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Debt
Endogenous risk
Stabilization
Risk premia
Government debt
Risk premium
Bifurcation analysis
Financial crisis
Financial markets
Recession
Real output
OECD countries
Differential games
Government
Non-cooperative game
Output growth
Information structure
Fiscal deficit

Keywords

  • debt stabilization
  • differential games
  • nonlinear dynamical systems
  • economic dynamics

Cite this

Engwerda, J. C., van Aarle, B., Plasmans, J. E. J., & Weeren, A. J. T. M. (2012). Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-056). Tilburg: Econometrics.
Engwerda, J.C. ; van Aarle, B. ; Plasmans, J.E.J. ; Weeren, A.J.T.M. / Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia. Tilburg : Econometrics, 2012. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Engwerda, JC, van Aarle, B, Plasmans, JEJ & Weeren, AJTM 2012 'Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 2012-056, Econometrics, Tilburg.

Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia. / Engwerda, J.C.; van Aarle, B.; Plasmans, J.E.J.; Weeren, A.J.T.M.

Tilburg : Econometrics, 2012. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2012-056).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

TY - UNPB

T1 - Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia

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AU - van Aarle, B.

AU - Plasmans, J.E.J.

AU - Weeren, A.J.T.M.

N1 - Pagination: 32

PY - 2012

Y1 - 2012

N2 - Abstract: As a result of the recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession, fiscal deficits have soared in many OECD countries. As a consequence, government debt has been on the rise again after a period of stable or declining government debt. In this paper we analyze debt stabilization in a country that features endogenous risk premia, imposed by financial markets that evaluate the probability of debt default by governments. Endogenous risk premia arise by assuming e.g. simple linear relations between risk premia and the level of debt. As a result the real interest rate on government debt can be written as a constant (measuring the risk-free real interest rate corrected for real output growth) plus an endogenous risk premium that depends on the debt level. We bring such endogenous risk premia into the Tabellini (1986) model [22] and analyze the impact of it. This gives rise to a nonlinear differential game. We solve this game for both a cooperative setting and a non-cooperative setting. The non-cooperative game is solved under an open-loop information structure. In particular we present a bifurcation analysis w.r.t. the risk premium parameter.

AB - Abstract: As a result of the recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession, fiscal deficits have soared in many OECD countries. As a consequence, government debt has been on the rise again after a period of stable or declining government debt. In this paper we analyze debt stabilization in a country that features endogenous risk premia, imposed by financial markets that evaluate the probability of debt default by governments. Endogenous risk premia arise by assuming e.g. simple linear relations between risk premia and the level of debt. As a result the real interest rate on government debt can be written as a constant (measuring the risk-free real interest rate corrected for real output growth) plus an endogenous risk premium that depends on the debt level. We bring such endogenous risk premia into the Tabellini (1986) model [22] and analyze the impact of it. This gives rise to a nonlinear differential game. We solve this game for both a cooperative setting and a non-cooperative setting. The non-cooperative game is solved under an open-loop information structure. In particular we present a bifurcation analysis w.r.t. the risk premium parameter.

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KW - nonlinear dynamical systems

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Engwerda JC, van Aarle B, Plasmans JEJ, Weeren AJTM. Debt Stabilization Games in the Presence of Risk Premia. Tilburg: Econometrics. 2012. (CentER Discussion Paper).