Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia

J.C. Engwerda, B. van Aarle, J.E.J. Plasmans, A.J.T.M. Weeren

Research output: Contribution to journalArticleScientificpeer-review

14 Citations (Scopus)


As a result of the recent financial crisis and the ensuing economic recession, fiscal deficits have soared in many OECD countries. As a consequence, government debt has been on the rise again after a period of stable or declining government debt. In this paper we analyze debt stabilization in a country that features endogenous risk premia, imposed by financial markets that evaluate the probability of debt default by governments. Endogenous risk premia arise by assuming, e.g., simple linear relations between risk premia and the level of debt. As a result the real interest rate on government debt can be written as a constant (measuring the risk-free real interest rate corrected for real output growth) plus an endogenous risk premium that depends on the debt level. We bring such an endogenous risk premium into Tabellini (1986) model and analyze the impact of it. This gives rise to a non-linear differential game. We solve this game for both a cooperative setting and a non-cooperative setting. The non-cooperative game is solved under an open-loop information structure. We present a bifurcation analysis w.r.t. the risk premium parameter.
Original languageEnglish
Pages (from-to)2525-2546
JournalJournal of Economic Dynamics & Control
Issue number12
Publication statusPublished - 2013


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