Decomposition of Network Communication Games

Bas Dietzenbacher, Peter Borm, Ruud Hendrickx

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Abstract

Using network control structures this paper introduces network communication
games as a generalization of vertex games and edge games corresponding to communication situations and studies their decomposition into unanimity games. We obtain a relation between the dividends of the network communication game and the underlying transferable utility game, which depends on the structure of the undirected graph. This relation extends the computational results for tree communication networks to general undirected graphs and is used to derive new characterizations of the Myerson value and the position value. Moreover, network communication games also allow to consider
both the vertices and the edges of the graph as players, leading to a new network value.
Original languageEnglish
Place of PublicationTilburg
PublisherCentER, Center for Economic Research
Number of pages17
Volume2015-057
Publication statusPublished - 10 Dec 2015

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume2015-057

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Keywords

  • network communication games
  • network control structures
  • decomposition theorems
  • Myerson value
  • position value

Cite this

Dietzenbacher, B., Borm, P., & Hendrickx, R. (2015). Decomposition of Network Communication Games. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 2015-057). Tilburg: CentER, Center for Economic Research.