TY - UNPB
T1 - Delays in Leniency Application
T2 - Is There Really a Race to the Enforcer’s Door?
AU - Gärtner, D.L.
AU - Zhou, J.
N1 - Pagination: 30
PY - 2012
Y1 - 2012
N2 - Abstract: This paper studies cartels’ strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy. Journal of Economic Literature
AB - Abstract: This paper studies cartels’ strategic behavior in delaying leniency applications, a take-up decision that has been ignored in the previous literature. Using European Commission decisions issued over a 16-year span, we show, contrary to common beliefs and the existing literature, that conspirators often apply for leniency long after a cartel collapses. We estimate hazard and probit models to study the determinants of leniency-application delays. Statistical tests find that delays are symmetrically affected by antitrust policies and macroeconomic fluctuations. Our results shed light on the design of enforcement programs against cartels and other forms of conspiracy. Journal of Economic Literature
KW - corporate leniency program
KW - cartel
KW - leniency application delays
M3 - Discussion paper
VL - 2012-044
T3 - TILEC Discussion Paper
BT - Delays in Leniency Application
PB - TILEC
CY - Tilburg
ER -