@techreport{f5f91d02451b4118803787c9a78c4a32,
title = "Deposit Games with Reinvestment",
abstract = "In a deposit game coalitions are formed by players combining their capital. The proceeds of their investments then have to be divided among those players. The current model extends earlier work on capital deposits by allowing reinvestment of returns. Two specific subclasses of deposit games are introduced. It is seen that each term dependent deposit game possesses a core element. Capital dependent deposit games are also shown to have a core element and even a population monotonic allocation scheme if the revenue function exhibits increasing returns to scale. Furthermore, it is shown that all superadditive games are deposit games if one allows for debt.",
keywords = "cooperative game theory, deposit games, core elements, population monotonic allo- cation schemes, superadditive games",
author = "{van Gulick}, G. and P.E.M. Borm and {De Waegenaere}, A.M.B. and R.L.P. Hendrickx",
note = "Subsequently published in European Journal of Operational Research, 2010 Pagination: 21",
year = "2007",
language = "English",
volume = "2007-22",
series = "CentER Discussion Paper",
publisher = "Operations research",
type = "WorkingPaper",
institution = "Operations research",
}