Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

R.M.W.J. Beetsma, A.L. Bovenberg

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Abstract

This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the union once the EMU has been formed is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend largely on monetary arrangements in the union.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages23
Volume1995-58
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-58

Keywords

  • Central Banks
  • Monetary Policy
  • EMS
  • Fiscal Policy
  • monetary economics

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    Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Bovenberg, A. L. (1995). Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-58). Unknown Publisher.