Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union

R.M.W.J. Beetsma, A.L. Bovenberg

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Abstract

This paper explores under what conditions a European Monetary Union (EMU) is an optimum currency area. The scope for an EMU increases with convergence of structural and fiscal policies, small money holdings, a conservative European Central Bank, and dependent national central banks. How national policies affect the rest of the union once the EMU has been formed is also investigated. The case for surveillance of national structural and fiscal policies appears to depend largely on monetary arrangements in the union.
Original languageEnglish
PublisherUnknown Publisher
Number of pages23
Volume1995-58
Publication statusPublished - 1995

Publication series

NameCentER Discussion Paper
Volume1995-58

Fingerprint

Fiscal
European Monetary Union
Fiscal policy
Central bank
Surveillance
Optimum currency area
European Central Bank

Keywords

  • Central Banks
  • Monetary Policy
  • EMS
  • Fiscal Policy
  • monetary economics

Cite this

Beetsma, R. M. W. J., & Bovenberg, A. L. (1995). Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-58). Unknown Publisher.
Beetsma, R.M.W.J. ; Bovenberg, A.L. / Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union. Unknown Publisher, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).
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Beetsma, RMWJ & Bovenberg, AL 1995 'Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union' CentER Discussion Paper, vol. 1995-58, Unknown Publisher.

Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union. / Beetsma, R.M.W.J.; Bovenberg, A.L.

Unknown Publisher, 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper; Vol. 1995-58).

Research output: Working paperDiscussion paperOther research output

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Beetsma RMWJ, Bovenberg AL. Designing fiscal and monetary institutions for a European Monetary Union. Unknown Publisher. 1995. (CentER Discussion Paper).